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mores and institutions can move only at a glacier-like pace
and as a result of natural forces beyond purposive human con-
trol.
Can we master the agencies and instruments of guided
social change that are available in the enlightened democracies
of the free world and focus them upon the goals of social,
economic, and political reconstruction demanded by the space
age? Can we drive home to this generation the r~~ation that
neither the concept of war as we have known It In the past,
nor the other principal means through which international
peace and stability were formerly sought have any validity i~
the new era? Can we shift from the divisive, self-defeating atn-
tudes of the ancient tribe to those of responsible concern for
the rights and welfare of all humankind under the rule of int~r­
national law? We must try, and only if we succeed can we rise
from the status of hapless earthlings to become masters of the
new world in space.
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From a working definition of description, the meaning of
idealized representation is presented. I t is suggested that, as
a universal means of depiction, idealized representation stands
in a contradictory relationship with the concrete conditions of
its production, generating descriptive irresponsibility. Features
of descriptive activity are presented, which serve as a basis for
redefining the moral character of idealized representation.
As a 'working definition, description might be .said to be
the process by which things, ideas, or events are represented.
Our intention is first to briefly develop the definition along a
conventional line in order then to make suggestions for a theory
of descriptive. activity ~ one that is social and informed by some
current sociological approaches to it and that generally frames
an ongoing program of related research. In the main, the sug-
gestions are intended to be practical; they do not aim toward
a final transcendent version of representation. Rather, they
provide a means for analytically perusing the working affairs
of those who concertedly engage in description. We shall argue
that, as a universal means of depiction, conventional or idealized
representation stands in a contradictory relationship with the
concrete 'working conditions of its production, generating des-
criptive irresponsibility.
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IDEALIZED REPRESENTATION
Perhaps the most popular way formally to interpret the
working definition is traced frequently, at least in sociological
context, to Durkheim's (1958) famous dictum to treat social
facts as things. As conventionally held in both textbook and
classroom, to report sociological findings is to represent things
(the variety of social objects and events) as they are in their own
rights. It is taken for granted that the latter virtually have
"rights" of their own, rights not held by assignment but as
essential features of their existence. Sociological description
which does not reveal social objects as they are, is not objec-
tively, but subjectively, remiss. Something about the process of
representation has gone awry. The aim of this interpretation of
description is to specify the conditions that optimize represen-
tation, ideally to be able to describe social objects and events
as they are in their own rights. Overall, two conditions do so-
reliability and validity-both of which are treated as technical
achievements. Means are devised to assure the consistent (re-
liable) representation of the way social objects really are (valid-
ity). Ideally, then, representation can be technically managed
so that description virtually becomes whatever is being described,
a state of description frequently spoken of as "concrete fact,"
meaning that fact as such is concrete.
While this interpretation is frequently attributed to Durk-
heirn, it is important to note that it is not altogether clear in his
various studies that he adh-eres to' it .(Hughes, 1958:284). Bellah
(1973), farone, suggests that Durkheim's contrasting "symbolic
realism" is revealed, perhaps most vividly, in his study of primi-
tive religion in the Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
(1961), where social objects have positive existence both in
their own rights (rites?) and as an artifice of their adherents'
both witting and unwitting treatment of them as such. This
immediately ties idealized representation to the process of
idealization. There is considerable theoretical distance between
the interpretation of ideal representation as the reflection of
social reality and as the product of its reconstruction. Durk-
heim's work can be read as standing tensely between them."
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The popularity of idealized representation-positivistic
description-is a formal one to the extent that it is an inter-
pretation of description made in a "scientific mood." Whether
scientists or laypersons are asked to specify the meaning of
good description, a positivistic standard commonly is assumed.
The standard serves to suggest that the road to objectivity (the
depiction of objects, not subjects) is marked by reliability and
validity. Being in a scientific mood, the idealization of represen-
tation is rendered by a set of attitudes and a course of action,
implying that such representation is not concrete fact in its
own right but the popular response to things and questions
about them as such. Again, we encounter theoretical divergence,
this time between a frame of reference that informs us, indepen-
dent of the circumstances at stake, how to describe ideal des-
cription, on the one hand, and the ideal representation that
circumstance and frame serve to portray, on the other.2
The scientific mood is a formally organized set of attitudes;
it is not simply a cognitive interest in description, one that out
of one or two other cognitive interests is a possible choice for
describing things. The scientific mood pervades organized social
science as well as the variety of formal organizations whose
members are obliged to describe people in some way. Among
the latter organizations is the full range of human service insti-
tutions where people-descriptions are evaluated both internally
and externally (accountability) for their approximation to
clinically idealized representation (Buckholdt and Gubrium,
1979; Gubrium and Buckholdt, 1982)~ Any associated "cogni-
tive interest" (Habermas, 1971) in the background of their
descriptive activity is not just cognitively assumed but is part
of the social organization of its production: description is con-
strained by membership obligations, not the least of which is
that description is also a job-a material condition. To interpret
good description as objective representation is to assume that one
can, in principle, ignore the conditions of its production, both
cognitive and material.
Recognition of the practical sources of idealized represen-
tation does not necessarily free one from its descriptive obliga-
tions. While a vision of alternate cognitive possibilities or insight
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into the human artifices of practice may display the possibilities
for change, it does not by this alone bring it about (Giddens,
1976:126). Those who produce idealized representations and
thereby serve a positivistic interpretation of description may,
in the right circumstance, come face to face with, and speak of,
their production-both in exasperation and in a good-humored
sense of absurdity-yet go on to subsequently serve the same
interpretation (Gubrium, 1980; Gubrium, Buckholdt and Lynott,
1982). Consciousness in regard to production is not merely
psychological; it is always at the same time social, which, because
of its practical duality, makes it possible for producers of
idealized representation to gain insight into their own practice
and yet continue to engage it (cf. Giddens, 1979). Moreover,
while insight by itself does not necessarily pose a threat to
formally organized description, it also can ~e personally man-
aged. In the matter of idealized representation, as long as one
manages to separate descriptive insight from formal descriptive
obligations, the personal contradictions are contained. And
furthermore, when it is sensed that insight is, at best, only
amusing (not to be taken seriously), related personal moral
obligations are assuaged. After all, it might be implied or even
flatly stated, it is only a joke that we literally work at idealiz-
ing representation, at burying the process of description in the
service of what description will be claimed to "really" represent
(see concrete examples in Buckholdt and Gubrium, 1979; and in
Gubrium and Buckholdt, 1982).
Positivistic~"aescription has been touted as 'universal, a
standard against which all description is to be judged. Yet it is
increasingly clear on micro-empirical grounds that its ostensible
universal criteria are produced by those who have an interest in,
or obligations for, idealized representation (Cicourel, 1964,
1968, 1973; Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963; Garfinkel, 1967; Gu-
brium and Buckholdt, 1979; Pfohl, 1978; Raffel, 1979). On his-
torical and theoretical grounds, it is now difficult to conceive of
how it is possible to overlook the pervasive role of more general
conditions of description in representation, like the historical
.embeddedness of interpretation as informed by a variety of
traditions from hermeneutices to structuralism (Gadamer, 1975;
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Theory of Descriptive Activity
Foucault, 1972, 1973), the politics of representation (Mills,
1963; Horowitz, ed., 1975;' Gouldner, 1970; Edelman, 1977),
and the sheer linguistic situatedness of meaning (Wittgenstein,
1969).3 It is evident that the theory and method of idealized
representation are not reconstructions of transcendent principles
of description but, rather, the displacement of descriptive alter-
natives by a single strategy of representation, a kind of descrip-
tive imperialism. To have such a state of representation is to
idealize it-an achievement, not a natural condition.
As Habermas (1971) suggests, it is important to note that
the theoretical and historical demotion of positivistic description
does not imply its elimination. It 'stands, rather, as a descriptive
alternative, one serving a different purpose from other forms
of description. Idealized representation becomes less a universal
standard for the evaluation of description than a useful means
for describing things.
However, ·as Weber (1958) feared over a half century ago
and as the early Frankfurt School (Horkheimer and Adorno,
1972; Held, 1980) so vehemently criticized, "instrumental
reason" seems to have come to virtually dominate our formal
organizational routines if not our private lives. With regard to
this state' of affairs, Hab erm as, evenhandedness is perhaps pre-
mature, a theoretical but certainly not a firmly evident future
of descriptive alternatives. Indeed, positivistic description is not
yet even an alternative in the university, especially in the Ameri-
can context, where the prevailing mode of descriptive production
. in the social sciences is diffusely tied to, and underwritten by,
requirements of so-called "social need," utility, and policy-
making, among a host of other interests that aim to control,
decontrol, and recontrol people's lives, usually, it is said, for
the common welfare.
DESCRIPTIVE IRRESPONSIBILITY
On present micro-empirical, historical, and theoretical
grounds, it is imperative that the term "representation" be
interpreted literally-as re-presentation-a process of offering
again whatever is believed was presented, to us by our senses
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in regard to objects and events of interest. This puts some dis-
tance between description and that which is described, a distance
containing what we call "descriptive activity." Descriptive
activity is organized around diverse rules, from historical to
organization, circumstantial, interpersonal, and interpretive
rules (cf. Douglas, 1973). The activity is by no means passive,
for those who engage in description taken into account the
variety of rules and, what is more, are not infrequently aware
that they do so.
In view of this, there is considerable irresponsibility as-
sociated with an analytic insistence on a universalistic theory
of idealized representation. By irresponsibility we intend to
mean both an empirical and moral condition. It is an empirical
condition to the extent that those responsible for representation
present themselves as mere servants of the truths they report
(cf. McHugh, Raffel, Foss, Blum, 1974, esp. chaps. 3 and 4).
At the same time, it is moral in the sense that it is socially
engaged people who expedite the tasks of description, wherein
they choose how to produce and present what they know.
In principle, to idealize representation is to generate des-
cription that precisely and truly mirrors whatever it represents,
nothing else. It should not reflect any aspect of descriptive
activity. Yet it does and, in practice, it is difficult to conceive
of it not doing so. For example, the author should not be part of
positivistic description; when he is, the description is said to be
biased. All sorts of technical procedures have been developed to
minimize authorship in positivistic .description, from randomi-
zation to blind experimentation. Ideally, the author should
disapper altogether, even in name. .
This ideal, however, is organizationally constrained. In
human service organizations, for instance, considerable effort
enters into the production of descriptively accurate accounts
of client care, treatment, and progress (e.g., Gubrium, 1980).
Human service documentation is evaluated by those who engage
in it as well as by those who receive it, in terms of standards
of positivistic description. Those who engage in the production
of the documents (in many cases, with as much methodological
acumen as formal social scientific studies) frequently remain
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unnamed. The content of documents is acceptable with no
reference to authorship except the indication that it is offered
under the aegis of a particular organization. The organization,
in effect, is the author and is held responsible for its contents.
Descriptive adequacy is directly linked with payment for services
rendered (that is, services described), usually retroactively.
Again it is difficult to conceive of how some form of authorship
would not accompany such human service descriptions, ideally
representational or otherwise. It is clear, in such cases, that
positivistic description cannot be completely transcendent to
its production. Dollars and cents urge (but do not assure) organ-
izational authors to be responsible, both descriptively and
materially.
And consider the university as a setting that organizes the
production of descriptions, as far as scientific ones are con-
cerned. The descriptions allegedly should approach idealized
representation. Is authorship absent here? Certainly not, since,
among other conditions, description is tied organizationally to
careers. In contrast to human service institutions, individual
describers have a personal stake in extending their authorship
(author-ity?) over as wide a range of descriptions as possible.
Authorship signals not only remuneration but honor. Yet this
too does not sit well with idealized representation, wherein a
strict adherence to positivistic description suggests anonymity.
There is a good deal of tension in all of this, which perforce
generates irresponsibility. On the one hand, adherence to ideal-
. ized positivistic description requires the trivialization.. if not
virtual elimination, of descriptive activity. On the other hand,
if description is to be done, if it is to exist at all, it must be
produced, which generates descriptive activity. Those who adhere
to the aim of idealized representation inevitably describe under
the aegis of the activity and circumstances of their production.
One resolution of the contradiction spawns descriptive irrespons-
ibility, a form of which is the implicit or explicit claim that
names (authors) are not, in principle, features of idealized
representation. There are, of course, related claims such that
idealized representation is ahistorical (law-like), noncircumstan-
tial (unobtrusive), and objective (impersonal). Taken together,
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they provide a set of disclaimers for descriptive irresponsibility,
warranting devices for glossing the alienation of description from
its production and fetishizing its end products.4 In the final
analysis, it seems description is tenaciously practical, a form of
labor, something that is done in the service of representation. To
deny this is to be irresponsible-as laypersons and as social
scientists-to the active participation that is an integral feature of
description.
DESCRIPTIVE ACTIVITY
Turning directly to descriptive activity, let us outline some
of its components and how they enter into description. Our
working tenet is: the representation of things, ideas, and events
is precisely re-presentational, the activity of presenting to an
audience whatever is considered to be reportable. As for ideal-
ized description, it is a state of representation that is presented
as such and mayor may not be similarly received, a condition
of descriptive activity toward which effort mayor may not be
concertedly expended, yet which is underpinned by a principle
of ideal communication. 5
Descriptive Circumstances
Like other components of descriptive activity, circum-
stance is both concrete and tenuous. It is concrete in that the
activities of representation occur in time and place; the only
senses in which they transcend the latter is in their working
depiction as such and in the principle of ideal communication
that makes' description itself a reasonable activity to pursue.
This contrasts with the positivistic view that description as such
more or less approximates an objective, yet transcendent ideal.
The concrete conditions of descriptive activity are the
diverse objects, resources, events, and social relations that both
penetrate and serve as the working background of representation.
For example, when a special education teacher describes the
progress of a student to colleagues, the teacher speaks of a range
of objects, from the student's IQ score to his achievement
test results, his daily classroom performance, reports from other
24
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teachers, and his personal maturity. These are treated as the
working realities of the teacher's description. On the one hand,
they are linguistically cast by the teacher and her audience as
the referential realities at hand; their language in speech and
gesture is tacitly articulated in reference to them as objects
separate from their description. On the other hand, the objects
referenced are further "realized" by their material representa-
tion. The teacher not only speaks about the child's achievement
test scores, she offers her colleagues the papers that document
them, which, in turn, may be further concretized by references
to them as "hard" evidence "in black and white" (cf. Gubrium
and Buckholdt, 1977; Buckholdt and Gubrium, 1979).
Varied concrete conditions serve as the working resources
of description. The teacher makes use of an understanding of
her own competence and that of her colleagues in describing
a student's progress. She may, for example, refer to herself as
one whom they all know to be a special education teacher with
extensive experience and training in working with hyperactive
children. On those concrete grounds (with that resource), she
then may further confirm the reality of the "objective" docu-
mentation she presented earlier. Indeed, her attempt to confirm
the realities at hand may reverse object and resource wherein
she uses her documentation of achievement to attest to the
objectivity of her claim to competence.
The separation of the concrete conditions of description
into categories of objects, resources, events, and social relations
is I?-0t purely substantive. It is a. practical categorization which
is, at once, both material and referential. In the course of on-
going ~escription, things come to serve as objects-to concretely
be objects-when they are assembled as such in their presenta-
tion. Needles to say, the same "things" become other working
conditions in their practical transformation in the course of
description. This is not a whimsical matter of definition or
redefinition but, rather, is meant to be understood as alterations
of the working conditions of description, conditions that not
only confirm definition but resist it as well. Things defined as"
real are, by that alone, not realities.f Yet at the same time it
is important from a practical point of view not to overdeterrnine
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the purely material meaning of concrete conditions; they are,
after all, concrete conditions for us. It is in this sense that con-
crete conditions are also tenuous.
Other conditions of descriptive circumstances are its on-
going events and social relations. The activity of describing
itself produces grist for its virtual re-presentation. Each des-
criptive action becomes, in the course of ongoing representation,
part of the concrete objects of, or resources for, descriptive
reproduction, reflexive and indexical features of their own
describability (Garfinkel, 1967; Mehan and Wood, 1975). For
example, as the teacher now describes her pupil's progress,
she refers back to the concrete "facts" that she, at some time
earlier, worked up as such and presented to her accepting col-
leagues. In their dialectical relation to ongoing activity, the
events played out in descriptive circumstances are part of its
concrete conditions.
All of this is referenced within a context of existing social
relations: teacher to colleagues, colleagues to supervisors, staff
members to families, organization to organizations. The social
relations are not fixed but they are encountered as a set of
present conditions (working constraints or resources) of des-
cription. Among other conditions, they specify who is obligated
to describe to whom and the aegis under which description is
made. For example, a school for emotionally disturbed children
obligates its staff members to produce descriptions of children's
progress to funding agencies (Buckholdt and Gubrium, 1979).
A recent court order- obligates case reviewers in a state hospital
for the criminally insane to present the rationale for predicting
the dangerousness of candidates for release (pfohl, 1978). In
these examples, the auspices are, respectively, membership on
a school's faculty and participation on a review board. In its
own right, aegis is both a feature of the relations of descriptive
production and a force in its legitimation. When a teacher states
that she must "put things" in a certain way in describing what
she knows for a funding agency, she makes reference to one of
the social relations of description. Yet when she exemplifies
a progressed product of her educational efforts, she legitimizes
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the social relations that serve to articulate her pedagogical
activities with others. Even failure serves legitimation in that it
need not necessarily call into question the structure of existing
social relations but, rather, its presently ineffective operation.
Descriptive circumstance is further specified by the extent
to which the concrete conditions of representation are co-present
or fragmented features, something which may be formally organ-
ized. For example, in one circumstance, staff members of a
nursing home may engage in working up written descriptions
of patient care in meetings where the objects of their care (pati-
ents) are present while, in another nursing home, the latter are
absent (Gubrium, 1980b). The location of official audiences for
description may also vary in the same way wherein some des-
criptive circumstances are organized with an audience beins a
direct witness to the working up of descriptions whereas others
are organized so that audiences receive completed descriptions.
In fact, both co-present and fragmented descriptive conditions
may occur in the same formal organization in respect to dif-
ferent audiences (cf. Gubrium and Buckholdt, 1982).
The bounds of descriptive circumstances are practical
ones. It is not as if the circumstances of description, in regard to
the scope of any of its conditions, can be specified a priori.
Rather, bounds are to be seen as they are by their circumstantial
practitioner, namely, as working bounds. For example, the
professional participants of a hospital's utilization review con-
ference may find themselves in a descriptive circumstance whose
working scope does not include the presence of the object" of
their deliberations-until sometime into the proceedings it is
learned that one of the participants is related to the patient
being discussed. Suddenly, the conditions of description are
center stage, demanding some resolution before the proceedings
continue. The bounds of descriptive circumstance, explicitly
or implicitly, are thereby integral features of the products of
descriptive activity. What is to appear in written form as a
"black and white" representation of something is articulated
in part by (indexical to) a boundary problematic.
We have centered our empirical considerations thus far on
the concrete conditions in the face-to-face circumstances in
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which people work up descriptions. In the circumstances, we
find members virtually working at the process of producing a
sense of the objects of concern to them. In the process, ,arti-
culated by the dialectics of references and realities, things to be
described take on their more or less valid representation. In this
sense, then, as ethnomethodology has so richly shown, repre-
sentation is-both in method and content-a matter of doing
description.
Audiences and Images .
Yet there is something too chaotic about this, not because
it is not in some way profoundly creative and unpredictable.
The "artful" (Garfinkel, 1967) aspects of descriptive work are
evident in the circumspection that is part and parcel of mem-
bers' attention to their descriptive activities: attention to things
as well as attention to their own attention toward them. Out of
this are produced senses of objects (e.g., of patient care, de-
linquency, dangerousness, school performance, and emotional
disturbance). Describers to artfully assign meaning to varied
categories of objects, the meaning articulated against and within
variations in the circumstantial conditions of description. But not
everything emerges in new form in the process. There seems to
be less art, not less artifice, at this end of things.
We have, of course, addressed this issue to some extent in
our comments about the working material conditions of des-
criptive production. In this section, we pinpoint the external
relations of production, 'especially the effect of their perceived-
obligations on the content of description.. People do not simply
engage in description together 'under the aegis of immediate
circumstantial conditions; they describe for someone. We refer to
those who are expected to be in receipt of the product of des-
criptive activity as its "audiences," descriptive markets as it were.
We limit our considerations here to the condition of description
in which audiences are not immediate witnesses to the process
wherein descriptions are produced. (For a study of the latter,
see Gubrium, 198Gb).
Like other working conditions of descriptive activity,
audience considerations delimit artful practices. More or less
28
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Theory of Descriptive Activity
reliable and valid representations are taken for granted as being
worked up for someone or other. In practice, these idealized
standards are managed against a background of expectations
about what state of representation shall constitute its reliable
and valid form. For example, in the matter of validity, where
the methodological issue is the question of whether description
really represents what it is claimed to be about, the background
question of "really for whom" demands attention. Implicit here
is the understanding that varied audiences may presume different
versions of the realities being described, have different images of
them. What might constitute literal validity for one audience
might not be literal valid for another. Images provide working
rules for articulating the content of description.
It is important to note that the understanding is a feature
of the working conditions of description, conditions that are
pervasive to descriptive activity. Underpinning it and descriptive
practice in general is a tacit adherence to a principle of de-
scribability. The understanding urges those who work up descrip-
tions to pursue adequate ones. The principle grounds the under-
standing and informs those who engage in description that, in the
final analysis, description is not altogether illusory.
At times in the process of description, image considerations
are rather evident. Studies of medical decision-making, for
example, show that the clinical staffs who participate in con-
ferences to review and work up descriptions (progress reports)
of patient care, organize what is to be said or written to au-
diences' around two considerationsr the real problems and care of
patients ~ the staff concretely experience them, and how the
experiences are to be presented to whomever staff is accountable
(Gubrium, 1980a; Gubrium and Buckholdt, 1982). While pro-
ceedings vary in the particular clinical experiences referenced
and debated, and with regard to the explanations and interpreta-
tions of the experiences, at some time therein attention is turned
to the descriptive issue of audiences. When the participants
seem to have exhausted a case or it is noted that "time is running
out," someone may quickly ask, "Okay, now, how do you want
to put that?" or "Does this sound alright to you?" Or after a
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written description has been read to the participant, the reader
may ask, "Do you think they'll [audience] buy that?" to which
might be added, "You all know that that's the way they think
about things?" It is evident in such questions and comments
that descriptive activity is not plainly representational but
representational with regard to whom things known are re-
presented.
In the midst of questions and comments like the preceeding
ones, it may be added that "it's too bad" that audiences or
people have such varied understandings of things or that "it
would be nice" if things could just be told the way they are.
Indeed, on unusually thought-provoking occasions, the same
spokesperson may broach the possibility that the participants
themselves, not their audiences, may be deceiving themselves-
that the concrete realities of their work may be different from
what they routinely think they are after all. It is not a founda-
tional principle as such that is questioned but what concrete
objects are to be taken as the ultimate grounds of description.
While in a given descriptive circumstances it might not be
known who the particular audience is or will be, the mere under-
standing that some audience or other will have access to
descriptions generates circumspection over content and style.
This delimits the artfulness of description. When the particular
audience is known, the artfulness is further contained, this time
by describers' sense of what a particular audience presumes to
be the concrete realities being described, being that audience's
image of the realities. .. '" ".-
The relation between audiences and images is practical.
Working rules-of-thumb, produced and reproduced out of on-
going historical and organizational experiences, inform describers
that, for all practical purposes, specific audiences have particular
images of the things being described. When an audience is de-
fined, a particular 'image is expected to serve as the frame for
portraying things. In the time and energy devoted to its resolu-
tion, the issue of audiences may loom larger than the formulation
of a description itself. Moreover, the formulation does not
proceed until an audience resolution is accepted (cf. Buckholdt
and Gubrium, 1979).
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Analytically, images are akin to what Goffman (1974)
has called "frames" in that both serve to organize experiences-
the one, experiences as described, the other, experiences as
expressed. They are working recipes for their related activities:
~ore or less known, images frame description. Once an image
IS assumed,. description virtually takes its particular natural
course, presents its own specific ideals to describers, and con-
fronts them with its own errors. But what description "owns"
is something given to it by those who participate in it. It is
only to that extent that image orders descriptive activity. Images
are not transcendent "structures" but practical ones (Giddens,
1979).
RESPONSIBLE DESCRIPTION
In conjunction with concrete conditions of description,
adhere~c~ . to idealized representation leads to descriptive ir-
responsibility, the attempt to act as if description were not
practical. As we noted, the irresponsibility is not only a matter
of personal ignorance but an organized feature of the intra-
and ~terinstitutional context of descriptive obligations, some
of WhIC~ .a:e c.alled "accountability." The morality of descriptive
responsibility IS profoundly social in that the intentions motivat-
ing the production of descriptions both arise out of, and attend
to, .the complex of rational, yet contradictory conditions around
which descriptive activity occurs.
. " . What, then, can be the responsibility of idealized representa-
tion? It is not a responsibility or emulating a transcendent
re~res~~tative i~eal,.but rather a responsibility to accuracy and
obJec~IvIty, which, In respect to the epistemological insight of
practIce, are standards for only one form of descriptive truth.
In t~e ?indsight of practice, objectivity is not a synonym for
~escrIptive truth; it only can be adjectival-objective (object-
like) truth as opposed to other descriptive forms (Habermas,
1971). Moreover, being practical, it is an integral feature of
descriptive obligations, obligations to be objective and accurate.
In this context, the latter are working, not transcendent ideals.
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To be descriptively responsible is to recognize that des-
criptive truth must harbor as much subjectivity and inexplica-
tion as objectivity and accuracy. Indeed) the practice of des-
cription is a complex dialectic of each) grounded in describ-
ability.
FOOTNOTES
1. Berger and Luckman (1966) attemp t to resolve the theoretical tension
by means of a dialectical treatment of knowledge production in every-
day life. Their work is, however, more "dialectical" in theory than in
practice. It is rather functionally Durkheirniam in that respect.
2. Habermas (1971) offers a practical/theoretical resolution to the diver-
gence in his theory of cognitive interests. Evenhandedly, Habermas
suggests that description does not transcend its process but is artic-
ulated through the cognitive interests of describers. For whatever
reason, some persons may take on what we have called a "scientific
mood" and idealize representation for what, Habermas states, aims at
control. Others or the same persons in a non-scientific mood, may take
on what might be called a "critical mood" in the presumed interest
of liberation and expose accuracy as one-dimension (cf. Marcuse,
1964), an ideology of truth.
3. Here we are speaking analytically, in terms of how representation is
to he conceived in view of what is now known about it. Certainly in
the concrete activity of describing, it is possible to overlook the per-
vasive role of the conditions of description when the practical recog-
nition and the positive application of descriptive activity are cog-
nitively and/or organizationally separated, as we mentioned earlier.
Our analysis itself is practical insofar as it is organized by an urge ·to
reveal and make. theoretical sense of all the conditions of description
including its own understanding. This does not necessarily lead to
descriptive relativism, for its urgency is distinct from an imperative
to precisely mirror some positive state of things. Rather, it is grounded
in the principle that all descriptive activity is informed by a vision that
there are increasingly general understandings of the conditions and
contents of description-an imperative, not a recipe. The urgency is
a non-substantially-defined, universal descriptive principle, to which
we shall return later in respect of Habermas' concept of the "ideal
speech situation" (see footnote 5).
4. Consider Marx' (1909) and, later, Lukacs' (1971) discussion of the
fetishization of commodities as a form of practical irresponsibility
exquisitely organized by capitalistic modes of production.
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5. There is a difference between the concrete presentation of ideal repre-
sentation and the principle of ideal communication, the latter making
communication itself reasonable. While descriptions offered and re-
ceived may be presented or evaluated as more or less ideally representa-
tive, the activities therein are tacitly informed by the understanding
that what is known could, in principle, be communicated, an anticipa-
tion articulated through the working conditions of description. As
Habermas (1970:144) puts it: " ... for every speech, even of inten-
tional deception, is oriented towards the idea of truth. This idea can
only be analyzed with regard to a consensus achieved in unrestraint
and universal discourse. Insofar as we master the means for the con-
struction of an ideal speech situation, we can conceive the ideas of
truth, freedom, and justice-which interpret each other-only as ideas
of course. For on the strength of communicative competence we can
by no means really produce the ideal speech situation independent of
the empirical structures of the social system to which we belong; we
can only anticipate this situation."
6. There is a tendency in the sym bolie in teractionist tradition to read
Mead in the opposite way, perhaps epitomized by perennial references
(especially in labeling theory) to W.1. Thomas' (1923) statement that
things defmed as real are real in their consequence. Blumer (1969,
1977, 1980), for one, has taken great pains to make it clear that this
is a statement about practice.
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